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Abstract
This paper examine in detail the impact of the crowdsourcee’s vertical fairness
concern on the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing
communities. The conditions for the establishment of the incentive mechanism is
analyzed and he impact of fairness concern sensitivity on expected economic
revenues of both sides as well as the crowdsourcing project performance is studied by
game theory and computer simulation. The results show that the knowledge sharing
incentive mechanism can only be established if the ratio between the performance
improvement rate and the private cost reduction rate caused by shared knowledge is
within a certain range. The degree of the optimal linear incentives, the private solution
efforts, and the improvement of knowledge sharing level are positively correlated
with the sensitivity of vertical fairness concern. In the non-incentive mode, the ratio
between the performance conversion rate of private solution effort and the
performance conversion rate of knowledge sharing effort plays an important role in
moderating a crowdsourcing project’s performance. We find that the number of
participants is either conducive or non-conducive to the improvement of performance.
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The implementation of knowledge sharing incentive can achieve a win-win situation
for both the crowdsourcer and the crowdsourcee.
Keywords: vertical fairness concern; knowledge sharing; incentive mechanism;
creative crowdsourcing community
Practitioners Points
 Focusing on the collaborative relationship among the crowdsourcees due to
knowledge sharing, we propose the crowdsourcing project performance formula
under the rules of “winner-takes-all”.
 We expound the influence of the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism on the
crowdsourcing project performance and analyze the influencing factors of the
optimal knowledge sharing incentive coefficients.
 We discuss the impact of the crowdsourcee’s vertical fairness concern on the
value of the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism.
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Introduction
With the development of the Internet and the prevalence of open innovation, the way
for enterprises to acquire knowledge has gradually expanded from internal employers
to the external public, which makes crowdsourcing popular among enterprises[1-3]
(Sindlinger 2010; Bontcheva et al. 2017; Poesio et al. 2017). World-renowned
companies such as P&G, Amazon and IBM have all established their own
crowdsourcing communities to improve their innovation efficiency. InnoCentive, a
third-party crowdsourcing innovation platform created by Eli Lilly and Company, is
known because of its unique “seeker-solver” mode, which has attracted many
companies to release technical problems, covering a variety of fields such as
biopharmaceutical, petrochemical, aerospace, scientific research. The number of
registered users has exceeded 10 million, spanning more than 70 countries and
regions worldwide, arguably one of the most important channels for many large
enterprises to implement open innovation[4] (Stol and Fitzgerald 2014).
The advantage of crowdsourcing innovation lies in “The crowd”, gathering the
wisdom of multiple participants, realizing diversified integration of knowledge, so as
to solve a problem or obtain high-quality crowdsourcing solutions in a timely and
effective manner. Interestingly, knowledge sharing is one of the most important
motivations for the public to participate in the crowdsourcing community, which
reflects one of the community’s most important characteristics[5-8] (Hansen 2002; Lin
et al. 2015; Yao et al. 2014; Chiu et al. 2007). At present, the most common incentive
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is for the crowdsourcer to offer a monetary reward which is competitively positioned.
Such “crowdsourcing contest” could result in the lack of communication and
interaction among the crowdsourcees and reduce the knowledge sharing under the
psychological effect of fairness concern. Arguably, the risk of resource wasting is
prominent, and the quality of crowdsourcing project is low.
Fairness concern can be divided into two subject areas. One is the horizontal fairness
concern among the crowdsourcees, and the other is the vertical fairness concern
between crowdsourcer and crowdsourcee. Interestingly, crowdsourcees with fairness
concern tend to be self-interested, arguably paying more attention to the rationality of
interest distribution between themselves and others under the constraints of project
resources, time, and cost. Therefore, in the process of knowledge sharing, the
economic benefits and distribution results will be carefully considered to maximize
the individual utility of knowledge sharing [9] (Shi et al. 2015). According to relevant
research, we are not amazing to see that one of the main reasons for the
crowdsourcee’s reluctance to participate in competitively-driven crowdsourcing
projects that could instill a feeling of unfair treatment long term [10](Hyman 2013).
The value created for the enterprise is not in direct proportion to their obtained
benefits, thus the realization of self-value is affected. Then, what is the mechanism of
the knowledge sharing in crowdsourcing community influencing the selection effort
put level? How will this affect the performance of crowdsourcing projects and the
economic interests of both parties? How to design an effective incentive mechanism
to enhance knowledge sharing? Will the vertical fairness concern of the crowdsourcee
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improve or reduce knowledge sharing behavior, and what kind of mediating effect
will this have on the value of incentive mechanism? We think these problems very
interesting and have strong practical significance.
Literature Review
This paper is related to the following streams of literature: crowdsourcing innovation
and its incentive mechanism, knowledge sharing behavior of knowledge subjects,
psychological characteristics of fairness concern.
Crowdsourcing Innovation and Its Incentive Mechanism
The concept of crowdsourcing, first proposed by Jeff Howe in Wired Magazine in
2006, indicates that crowdsourcing enables innovation which traditionally needs to be
implemented by internal employees to be outsourced to a large, undefined group
[11](Howe 2008). Goodman and Paolacci[12](2017), Mahmood et al.[13](2015)
elaborated on crowdsourcing innovation in Data collection and outsourcing. They all
attributed its development to the computer and communication technology. From the
perspectives of processes and motivations, crowdsourcing innovation is divided into
two types: collaborative crowdsourcing[14] (Feyisetan and Simperl 2017) and
crowdsourcing contest. Crowdsourcing innovation consists of three main dimensions:
crowdsourcer (or sponsor), crowdsourcee (or solver), and crowdsourcing platform.
The crowdsourcer can be an individual, a public institution, a company, or even a
non-profit organization[15] (Estellés 2012). The crowdsourcing platform is not
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necessarily built by the crowdsourcer but can be created and operated by an
intermediary company, which is mainly dedicated to providing innovative solutions
for enterprises [16](Bartek et al. 2017). Crowdsourcees come from all over the world,
they gather together through the Internet and communicate with each other by
information technology [17](Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich 2015).
How to improve the project performance (or project quality) is a main problem of
crowdsourcing,which raises the enthusiasm for incentive mechanism study of which
the basis is the participation motivation of the crowdsource[18] (Terwiesch and Yi
2008). Material needs such as money, job opportunities are undoubtedly important
motivational factors[19] (Alsayasneh et al. 2017), the non-physical needs of knowledge
acquisition and sharing[20] (Ahmad et al. 2017), propaganda and self-development[21]
(Calma et al. 2018), trust[22] (Stahlbrost and Kareborn 2011) should not be neglected.
Luo and Tham[23] (2012) proposed two types of incentive mechanisms respectively to
maximize social utility. Wu et al.[24] (2015) set an incentive mechanism based on the
internet user’s historical service credibility; Zhang et al. [25](2015) established three
auction models according to the number of service platforms and user bids. The above
incentive mechanism is mainly aimed at the competitive relationship among the
crowdsourcees in crowdsourcing innovation. On the rule of the “winner-takes-all” in
crowdsourcing contest, we pay more attention to the collaborative relationship among
the crowdsourcees due to knowledge sharing, especially, we explore how this
collaborative relationship is deeply maintained and how it affects the quality and
performance of the crowdsourcing project.
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Knowledge Sharing Behavior and Incentives for Knowledge Subjects
By sharing useful knowledge with team members, knowledge subjects can jointly
create the overall performance of the whole team. Therefore, knowledge sharing is the
most important and effective way to reflect the value of knowledge and improve
project performance[26] (Blohm et al. 2010). As a result, many companies have begun
to develop a widely used knowledge management practice to create a sharing
atmosphere through the use of incentives. Material means firstly attract the attention
of scholars [27-28](Hedberget al. 2016; Camille et al. 2017;). Building on this logic, Seo
et al. [29](2016), Hsu et al. [30] (2007) found that the main motives of knowledge
sharing behaviors are subjective factors such as personal expectations, member trust,
risk aversion. Hao et al.[31] (2016) considered the knowledge sharing behavior in the
crowdsourcing contest, designed the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism in the
crowdsourcing community based on game theory in order to study the relationship
between knowledge sharing effort and answering effort. The basic model of this paper
is similar to Hao’s paper, but we further explore the influencing factors of the
knowledge sharing degree, and deeply analyse its impact on the crowdsourcing
performance and the economic benefits [31] (Hao et al. 2016).
Psychological Characteristics of Fairness Concern
A sense of fairness is a key factor in determining the level of knowledge sharing effort.
Individuals not only pay attention to their own interests in the process of knowledge
sharing, but also care about the benefit and distribution fairness of others
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[32](Samuelson 1993). The fairness preference utility functions mainly include
distribution fairness represented by FS utility function[33] (Fehr and Gachter 2000) . In
principal-agent theory, the horizontal fairness represented by the income among
similar agents has certain universality [34]( Karagozoglu and Keskin, 2018), but most
practice shows the vertical fairness preference represented by the interest comparison
between principal and agent is more representative. Vertical fairness concern is now
more widely used in the pricing decision of supply chain[35-37] (Caliskan 2010; Du and
Du 2010; Guo and Jiang 2016). Some literature has begun to focus on this issue in
corporate incentive mechanism. Studies have shown that when employees envy their
employers, their jealousy (vertical fairness concern) tightens their participation
constraints and requires higher profit distribution[38](Englmaier and Wambach 2005);
Li et al.[39] (2016) introduce retailer’s vertical fairness concerns into the encroachment
problem and explore its impact. It is shown that encroachment may be detrimental to
the supplier when the retailer has strong fairness concerns and a significant marketing
advantage. This paper introduces the vertical fairness concern of the crowdsourcee in
the field of crowdsourcing innovation, trying to analyse the impact of this psychology
on the cooperative and competitive relationship among knowledge subjects, and also
explores in depth whether the crowdsourcer can overcome the negative effects of the
fairness concern through optimized knowledge sharing incentives.
Aims, Contributions and Organizations of this Paper
From the above literature review, it can be seen that most of the existing relevant
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researches focus on the innovation effort input under the crowdsourcing contest, and
rarely discuss the knowledge sharing behavior and incentive mechanism among in the
crowdsourcing community, especially the literature considering the fairness concern
of the crowdsourcees. This seems to have some gap with practice. Therefore, this
paper aims to explain the internal mechanism of collaborative relationship among the
crowdsourcees due to knowledge sharing, and to clarify the relationship between the
psychology of fairness concern, behavior of knowledge sharing and performance of
crowdsourcing projects. It overturns our traditional impression of the pure
competitive relationship among the crowdsourcees in the existing research and
expands the application scope of principal-agent theory and psychological contract
theory. In practice, it provides reference for crowdsourcing organizers to effectively
increase knowledge sharing behavior in the community and improve crowdsourcing
project performance through the design of incentive mechanism and guidance of
fairness concern.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The third part carries out the basic
description of the model, constructs and solves the decision-making modes NKS (no
knowledge sharing incentive) and KS (knowledge sharing incentive) and obtains the
optimal value expression of decision variables and performance variables. The fourth
part is the mathematical analysis of the results. Through the sensitivity analysis, we
explore the behavior decisions and the crowdsourcing performance, discuss and
compare how the economic benefits of both sides are affected by vertical fairness
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concern. Furthermore, we reveal the impact of the vertical fairness concern on the
value of the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism through a comparative analysis.
The fifth part is numerical simulation which verifies some of the conclusions and
further explores the impact of knowledge sharing incentives, fairness concern on the
economic benefits and value of the crowdsourcer. Closing off with a conclusion
summary and management inspiration statement.
Model
Problem Description and Assumptions
We consider a creative crowdsourcing community in which the crowdsourcer
publishes a creative project task, and n crowdsourcees participate in the task in a
competitive way. Different from the generally competitive crowdsourcing platform,
this community provides a convenient communication channel for knowledge sharing
among the crowdsourcees and it contributes to the increase of the knowledge stock,
which can not only improve the task performance but also reduce the cost of solutions.
The crowdsourcer decides the winner according to the quality of the solutions
submitted by each crowdsourcee, and awards the winner with the amount of A, which
reflects the relationship of both competition and collaboration among the
crowdsourcees.
The crowdsourcee i ’s efforts are divided into two parts: private solution effort ie
and knowledge sharing effort is . According to Terwiesch and Yi[18](2008), we
assume the private solution effort can improve the quality of the submitted solution by
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lni ie with the cost  i e iC e c e , where i is called the conversion rate of private
effort performance which represents the knowledge, experience and ability of the
crowdsourcee. On the other hand, the crowdsourcee i makes the knowledge sharing
effort is through online communication, interactive discussion and other ways to
improve the knowledge stock of the community. In view of the multiplicative effect
of knowledge subject[9], the level of knowledge stock in crowdsourcing community
can be expressed as jS s  ( 0 1  ), in which  is the proportion of
knowledge input of each crowdsourcee. It is obvious that when the crowdsourcees are
homogeneous, we get 1/ n  . According to Blohm et al.[26] (2010), the
crowdsourcing project performance improved by knowledge stock can be expressed
as iS , while the level of private solution effort cost reduced by knowledge stock is
e ic k S of which i is called the performance conversion rate and ik the private
effort cost reduction rate. We also assume that the crowdsourcee i pays a knowledge
sharing effort cost of 2 2i ih s / .
For a creative crowdsourcing project, the performance level iv of the solution
submitted by crowdsourcee i is detemined by its own experience and ability, the
level of private solution effort, the community’s knowledge stock and random factors
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v e ,s , lne + s   

  (1)
i is a random item, which indicates the uncertainty in the selection of solutions due
to the different interests and hobbies of the crowdsourcer. We suppose i obeys the
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Gumble distribution with a median value of 0 and a scale of u . According to Hao et
al.[31] (2016), the winning probability of crowdsourcee i can be expressed as follows:
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We assume that all crowdsourcees have vertical fairness concern. Referring to the
research of Du and Du[36] (2010), the decision-making objective of subjects with
fairness concern is utility maximization. The utility formula is
 i i i i fU       (3)
i  0 1i  is called vertical fairness concern coefficient which indicates the
sensitivity of the fairness concern psychology of crowdsourcee i. shows
the revenue gap between the crowdsourcee and the crowdsourcer. When i f  ,
fairness concern is manifested as “pride”, and the psychological utility increases;
When i f  , fairness concern is embodied as “jealousy”, and the expected
psychological utility decreases. Other important assumptions used in this paper are as
follows:
· All the crowdsourcees are homogeneous, with the same shared knowledge
performance conversion rate, the same shared knowledge solution cost reduction
rate, the same shared knowledge cost coefficient, and the same vertical fairness
concern coefficient, i.e. 1 2 n...       , 1 2 nk k ... k k    ,
1 2 nh h ... h h    , 1 2 n...       .
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· The actual crowdsourcing project performance obtained by the crowdsourcer is
expressed by the expected project performance contributed by the winning
crowdsourcee.
· Decision-making of both sides is a stackelberg game process where the
crowdsourcer is the game leader and the crowdsourcees are the followers among
whom it is a static game.
· All the content in the crowdsourcing community is open, so all the above
information is common knowledge.
Obviously, under the assumption of homogeneity, all private solution efforts and
knowledge sharing efforts of the crowdsourcees must be the same. Thus, Formula (2)
- the winning probability of i can be further expressed as
     
   
1
1 1
i i i i j j j j
i








   
 
(4)
In Formula (4), e is the general term for the private solution efforts. Thus, we can
see that increasing the knowledge sharing effort cannot improve the winning
probability of crowdsourcees if they have the same shared knowledge performance
conversion rate.
For the crowdsourcer, its benefit is determined by the crowdsourcing performance
submitted by the winning crowdsoucee, and its cost is the project bonus. So the
expected net revenue of the crowdsoucee can be expressed as:
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In the above formula, the first item is the project performance, i.e. the expected
revenue of the crowdsourcer, which is the weighted sum of each crowdsoucee’s
winning probability and the performance of the solution provided, the second item is
the bonus set by crowdsoucer for every crowdsourcing contest project, and the third
item is the knowledge sharing reward which is zero when the knowledge sharing
incentive mechanism is not implemented.
Model 1: Decision-making without Knowledge Sharing Incentive (NKS)
According to the above description, the expected revenue of the crowdsoucee i is
consisted only of the project bonus when there is no knowledge sharing incentive. It
can be expressed as
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 
 (6)
The crowdsoucer’s expected revenue is shown in Formula (5), where .
Thus, we can derive the crowdsoucee i’s expected utility function under the vertical
fairness concern according Formula (3), that is:
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According to the Assumption (4), the decision sequence is: (1) the crowdsourcer
decides the project bonus A; (2) the crowdsoucee decides its private solution effort ie
and knowledge sharing level is . Lemma 1 summarizes the equilibrium results of the
model NKS. All the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 1: When the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism is not implemented,
the expression of optimal private solution effort of the crowdsoucee when the project
bonus is fixed and is variable, the optimal level of knowledge sharing, the
crowdsoucee’s expected economic revenue, the project bonus set by the crowdsoucer,
the crowdsoucer’s expected economic revenue, the expected project performance
are as follows respectively:
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Model 2: Decision-making with knowledge sharing incentive (KS)
This section considers the model of implementing knowledge sharing incentive
mechanism in the crowdsourcing community. The mechanism is described as follows:
in the sharing area (such as BBS), the crowdsourcer carefully observes the extent to
which the crowdsourcee discloses valuable knowledge and the frequency of
communication, analyses the correlation among the exchanged contents, and
determines the observable degree of its knowledge sharing behavior i ( we can
get 1 2 n...       from the assumption of homogeneity) , and the crowdsourcer
accordingly gives them the unit reward at level b. Therefore, crowdsourcee i can get
the knowledge sharing benefit of ib s . Since b affects the incentive cost of the
crowdsourcer as well as the knowledge sharing level, there must be a game
relationship between them. We know that the shared knowledge does not change the
winning probability of the crowdsourcee, so it is still as shown in Formula (6). Figure
1 describes the main process of the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism.
ADD FIGURE 1. HERE ABOUT
We can get the expected revenue of crowdsourcee i under knowledge sharing
incentive mechanism:
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And the expected revenue of the crowdsourcer is
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Similar to the model NS, the i’s expected utility function under the vertical fairness
concern can be expressed as
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The game order can be described as: (1) the crowdsourcer decides the project bonus A;
(2) the crowdsourcee decides the linear unit knowledge sharing reward b; (3) the
crowdsourcee decides its private solution effort ie and knowledge sharing level is
Lemma 2 summarizes the equilibrium results of the model KS. All the proofs are
presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 2: When the incentive mechanism of knowledge sharing is implemented, the
expression of the optimal private solution effort of the crowdsoucee when the project
bonus is fixed and is variable, the optimal level of knowledge sharing, the
crowdsourcee’s expected revenue, the optimal project bonus, the optimal linear unit
knowledge sharing reward , the crowdsourer’s expected revenue, and the expected
project performance are as follows respectively:
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We now explore the impact of the vertical fairness concern on the conditions for
establishing the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism, and its influence on the
input of private efforts, the level of knowledge sharing, expected project performance
and the estimated revenue of the crowdsourcer. We also study in detail the economic
value of the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism. Propositions are as follows.
Proposition 1. When the knowledge sharing incentive is not implemented: (1) Only
when the project bonus A is above the threshold   2 1 1un / n    , the
crowdsourcee is willing to participate in the crowdsourcing project, while the
threshold is positively related to  ; (2) only when the ratio ( / k ) between the
performance improvement rate, and the cost reduction rate of private solution brought
by shared knowledge, is below the threshold  1 ec /  , that the crowdsourcee is
willing to share knowledge, and the threshold is negatively related to  .
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The proposition shows that when the crowdsourcee has vertical fairness concern, the
crowdsourcing contest project bonus should not be set too low, which matches our
intuition that Zhubajie.com requires the prize for each competition item be no less
than RMB500. Whether the crowdsourcee is willing to share knowledge is not related
to the project bonus, but to the ratio of performance improvement rate and solution
cost reduction rate. Only when the ratio is below a certain threshold can knowledge
stock significantly reduce the cost of private solutions, the crowdsourcee then has the
motivation to share knowledge. We also find that the greater the sensitivity of fairness
concern, the lower the threshold, and the crowdsourcee is less likely to share
knowledge.











crowdsourcer will implement the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism, and the
threshold is negatively related to  . (2) Under the knowledge sharing incentive
mechanism, the crowdsourcee must be willing to share knowledge.
The proposition shows that for the crowdsourcer, the knowledge sharing incentive
mechanism is only implemented when the knowledge sharing performance
improvement rate is higher than a certain threshold, otherwise it will be abandoned
because of the excessive incentive cost. In addition, the higher the sensitivity of
vertical fairness concern, the lower the crowdsourcer’s requirement for the
performance improvement rate, leading to greater probability of implementing the
incentive mechanism because the crowdsourcee is more mindful of the revenue gap.
From this perspective, vertical fairness concern helps to improve the status of the
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crowdsourcee in the game. Once the incentive mechanisms are implemented, the
crowdsourcee is willing to share the knowledge unconditionally, which is
significantly different from the findings in Proposition 1 where there is no
implementation of incentive mechanism.
Proposition 3. When the incentive mechanism condition is established, KS*b is
positively correlated to  and  , negatively correlated to k and  . When / k
is larger, KS*b is negatively correlated to n ; when / k is smaller, KS*b is
negatively correlated to n .
The proposition expounds the influencing factors of the optimal linear unit reward in
knowledge sharing set by the crowdsoucer. Firstly, it is positively correlated with the
sensitivity of the vertical fairness concern. As shown in Proposition 4.1, the stronger
bargaining power gained by vertical fairness concern must stimulate the crowdsourcer
to increase the knowledge sharing incentive and ensure the projects performance.
Secondly, the knowledge sharing performance improvement rate will enhance the unit
reward, while the solution cost reduction rate will play a negative role. It is worth
noting that the knowledge sharing frequency  does not increase the level of
knowledge sharing incentives, for the crowdsourcer could generate an opportunistic
psychology of “stronger gets no rewards”, and they believe that the crowdsourcee will
share knowledge without any motivation. Finally, When the performance
improvement rate is high, or the solution cost reduction rate is low, increasing the
number of crowdsourcees will intensify the competition among them. Therefore, the
crowdsourcer will reduce the rewards to save cost; conversely, it will highlight the
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vertical fairness concern effect, and the crowdsourcer has to increase the knowledge
sharing rewards.
Proposition 4. (1) KS* NKS*A A , KS*A is positively related to  and n; (2)
KS _ NKS _
i ie e , KS* NKS*i ie e , NKS _ie is negatively related to  , KS*ie is positively
related to  and n.
The proposition shows that the optimal crowdsourcing project bonus set by the
crowdsourcer and the crowdsourcee’s private solution effort, are not related to
whether the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism is implemented. The
crowdsourcee does not have to worry about receiving their bonus because of sharing
knowledge. If the bonus of a crowdsourcing project is fixed, the degree of private
effort is declined with vertical fairness concern. However, when the bonus is variable,
the crowdsoucer will certainly increase the bonus, because of the existence of fairness
concern, which will stimulate crowdsourcees to put more solution efforts. In addition,
as the number of crowdsourcees continues to increase, they will improve private
solution efforts due to the competitive effect regardless of the sensitivity of the
fairness concern. That is why more crowdsourcing platforms (such as Innocentive and
Zhubajie) use variable bonuses to attract more crowdsourcees to join.
Proposition 5. When the incentive mechanism condition is met, (1) 0NKS*is  ,
NKS*
is is negatively related to  ; (2) KS*is is positively related to  ; (3)






,  KS* NKS*i is s
is negatively related to n; otherwise,  KS* NKS*i is s is negatively related to n.
We can see from the proposition that even knowledge sharing incentives are not
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implemented, crowdsourcee will still share knowledge for the purpose of reducing
private effort cost, which is quite different from Hao et al.[31] (2016). But the level of
knowledge sharing is negatively correlated with the sensitivity of vertical fairness
concern. The reason is that, the higher the knowledge stock, the greater the project
performance which should bring larger benefits to the crowdsourcer. It will
ineluctably lead to an envy psychology of the crowdsourcee, and a significant
decrease in knowledge sharing when they anticipate the above situation. When the
knowledge sharing incentive is implemented, the conclusion will be the opposite. The
crowdsourcer will increase unit knowledge sharing reward b with vertical fairness
concern according to Proposition 4. 2, the utility loss of the crowdsourcee will be
compensated.
The proposition also shows that the increment effect of the knowledge sharing
incentive mechanism will expand with the vertical fairness concern. However,
whether the crowdsourcee’s number will help the increment of knowledge sharing
depends on the ratio / k . When the ratio is high, the dominant effect of knowledge
sharing behavior (for the improvement of project performance) is greater than the
hidden effect (for the reduction of private cost). The envy psychology accumulated
will reduce their knowledge sharing effort; when the ratio is low, the hidden effect is
higher than the dominant effect, and the cumulative “proud” psychology will increase
knowledge sharing effort.











 ,  NKS*E v is necessarily
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negatively related to  ; (2)  KS*E v must be positively correlated with  ; (3)
   KS* NKS*E v E v ,     KS* NKS*E v E v is always positively related to ; when ekc  ,
    KS* NKS*E v E v is positively correlated with n; conversely, they are negatively
related.
This proposition describes the impact of the vertical fairness concern’s sensitivity of
the crowdsourcee on the expected performance of the crowdsourcing project.
Specifically speaking, when the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism is not
implemented, the relationship between the expected performance level, and the
sensitivity of fairness concern depends on the ratio between the conversion rate of
private effort performance and the square of the conversion rate of shared knowledge
performance ( 2/  ). When the ratio is high, it indicates that the improvement effect
of private solution efforts on performance, is more obvious than the shared knowledge
stock. The vertical fairness concern is beneficial to increase the performance by
enhancing the private solution input. When the ratio is low, the jealousy of the
crowdsourcee will weaken the level of knowledge sharing. Therefore, the project
performance is negatively correlated with the vertical fairness concern. However,
under the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism, the rewards obtained from the
mechanism enhancing their motivation of knowledge sharing. As a result, the two
types of efforts and expected performance are both improved.
Finally, we can say that the degree of performance increment produced by incentive
mechanism has always increased with the fairness concern sensitivity. Further,
whether the crowdsourcee’s number contributes to the project performance value
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depends on the ratio / k . This is contrary to some classical literature on
crowdsourcing such as Howe[11](2008), who believed the advantage of crowdsourcing
is the crowd wisdom. Only when the ratio is low will the result be positive.
Therefore, regardless of the relative or absolute performance improvement of the
crowdsourcing project, implementing knowledge sharing incentive mechanisms and
attracting more crowdsourcees with strong fairness concern should be the best choice
for the crowdsourcer.
Proposition 7. When the incentive mechanism condition is established: (1)
KS* NKS*
f f  , and  KS* NKS*f f  is always positively related with  ; when
    
     2
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is met, NKS*f and KS*f are positively related
to ; otherwise, NKS*f is negatively related to .
The proposition shows that the crowdsourcer always has the economic motivation to
implement the knowledge sharing incentive. Moreover, with the increase of vertical
fairness concern sensitivity, the impact of knowledge sharing incentive mechanism on
the crowdsourcer’s ecomomic value (i.e. relative revenue increment) is also
increasing. That is to say, the vertical fairness concern can simultaneously achieve
Pareto improvement on the project performance and the relative economic benefits of
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knowledge sharing. However, the increase of the number of crowdsourcees places
uncertainty on the role of knowledge sharing in stimulating economic value. Due to
the impact of vertical fairness concern, only when the knowledge sharing performance
conversion rate is relatively lower than the private solution cost reduction rate, must it
be effective for crowdsourcer to expand the size of crowdsourcing communities.
On the other hand, if the economic benefits generated by the private solution efforts
are taken into account, the vertical fairness concern does not necessarily benefit the
absolute expected gains of the crowdsourcer. Only when the crowdsourcee has a
higher problem-solving ability, can the absolute economic benefit of the crowdsourcer
in NKS mode increase accordingly. Otherwise, although the knowledge sharing
incentives are economical, it is unable (at least in NKS mode) to use vertical fairness
concern to increase economic revenue due to the inefficiency of the private solution
efforts.
Simulation and Discussion
In view of the complexity of the model results, this part mainly uses the numerical
simulation method to study the economic benefits of the crowdsourcee and verify
some of the above important propositions.
Referring to Hao et al. [31](2016), we set the basic numeric parameters as follows:
0 2ec . , 0 1h . , 2  . First, we explore the crowdsourcee’s relative economic value
generated by knowledge sharing incentive mechanism ( KS* NKS*i i  ). Without the
loss of generality, we set the conversion rate of private effort performance at 0 8.  ,
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and then select two cases of (1) 0 4 0 2. ,k .   and (2) 0 1 0 3. ,k .   . The comparison
figure is shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
ADD FIGURE 2. HERE ABOUT
ADD FIGURE 3. HERE ABOUT
It can be seen from Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 that all the curves are located above the 0 axis
which indicates the incentive mechanisms generate positive value to the crowdsourcee,
thus it helps to achieve a win-win situation for both parties. Comparing the two
figures, we then disclose the regulated effect of ratio / k . When / k is low (Fig. 2),
the economic value curve is always obliquely upward, and the position of the curve
with larger n is higher. This shows that when the dominant effect of the knowledge
stock is lower than the hidden effect, the “proud” psychology can promote
crowdsourcee’s higher knowledge sharing behavior which brings them greater
economic value by improving project performance. In this case, the more the
crowdsourcees, the stronger the crowdsourcee’s bargaining power and the higher the
economic value of knowledge sharing. However, when /  is higher (Fig. 3), the
result will be opposite. We can see that curves all rise first and then fall, except when
5n  . This means that when the dominant effect is greater than the hidden effect, the
external manifestation of vertical fairness concern will definitely be “envy”. Although
the knowledge sharing behavior is enhanced by incentive, it is only a passive action
which has limited effect and cannot offset the knowledge sharing cost. Therefore,
when the sensitivity of fairness concerns is relatively high, the economic value will
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show a downward trend. In this case, the increase in the number of crowdsourcees
also means an increase in competition and a weakening of the knowledge sharing
behavior. This is similar to the change in the value of the crowdsourcer.
Now we will discuss the total absolute expected economic gain of crowdsourcees
included project bonus. Firstly, we set 8n  , analyse the influence of  on
KS*
i under different /  values. And then fixing 0 5 0 4. , .   , we obtain the
trend graph of KS*i changing with n under different  , as shown in Figure 4 and
Figure 5.
ADD FIGURE 4. HERE ABOUT
ADD FIGURE 5. HERE ABOUT
It can be seen from Figure 4 that regardless the ratio /  , the existence of vertical
fairness concern must help to improve the absolute economic gain, which is obviously
different from relative value. But when the fairness concern is certain, the increasing
of /  is conducive to promote economic gain. This matches the rules of project
bonus and implies that trying to be the winner of the crowdsourcing contest is still the
main revenue source for the crowdsourcee. No matter how the sensitivity of fairness
concern changes, the absolute economic gain must be positively correlated with the
number of crowdsourcees. Further, we can see the vertical fairness concern is also
conducive to increasing the marginal contribution of crowdsourcee numbers from the




Crowdsourcing is recognized as an important innovation issue facing all kinds of
enterprises and the society at this time, and the knowledge sharing is of great
significance to the crowdsourcing community. In this paper, an incentive mechanism
for knowledge sharing is designed when the crowdsourcee has vertical fairness
concern. Along the line of innovation efforts to crowdsourcing performance to
economic benefits, we use the game theory to establish and solve the non-knowledge
sharing incentive model (NKS) and knowledge sharing incentive model (KS), and
further discuss the impact of the vertical fairness sensitivity on the private solution
effort, knowledge sharing level, project performance and economic interests of both
sides. We have got some solid and meaningful conclusions from the research.
Firstly, though knowledge sharing helps to reduce the crowdsourcee’s cost of private
solution, it can’t improve its winning probability in crowdsourcing contest because
each crowdsourcee benefits the same from it. As a result, the KS mechanism will only
be workable if ratio / k is within a certain range. If the ratio is too high, the
private cost reduction obtained can’t promote the crowdsourcees to share knowledge
while the incentive mechanism will be abandoned by crowdsoucer because of the
excessive incentive cost if the ratio is too low. When the condition is met,
crowdsourcees will spontaneously share knowledge because of the private cost
reduction even if there is no incentive. This is quite different from the results of Hao
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et al. [31](2016) who believe that knowledge sharing behavior can only be generated
under the stimulation. For the same reason of winning probability, we can say that the
implementation of KS mechanism will neither increase the project bonus, nor increase
the degree of the private solution effort.
Secondly, we find the important role of crowdsourcees’ fairness concern plays in
crowdsourcing community. If knowledge sharing incentive mechanism is not
implemented (i.e. model NKS), the level of knowledge sharing will significantly
decrease with fairness concern for it should bring larger benefits to the crowdsourcer
and will ineluctably lead to an envy psychology of the crowdsourcees. When
knowledge sharing incentive mechanism is implemented (i.e. model KS), vertical
fairness concern will lead to high knowledge sharing behavior thanks to the increasing
of unit knowledge sharing reward. It is good to see that when crowdsourcees fairness
concern become more sensitive, the private effort of the crowdsourcee increases in
variable project bonus all the time. Because only “private” factors can really promote
the winning probability in crowdsourcing contest and meet their “proud” psychology,
which is line with the conclusions of Li et al.[39] (2016).
Thirdly, the crowdsourcing project performance is the most attractive indicator in
crowdsourcing innovation and is determined by the crowdsourcee’s private solution
effort and the shared knowledge stock, so KS model is more conductive to it than
NKS model undoubtedly. But the relationship of the project performance with fairness
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concern sensitivity and the number of crowdsourcees remain uncertain. As mentioned
above, in model KS, private and knowledge sharing effort are all positively with
fairness concern sensitivity, so it will definitely improve project performance.
However, in model NKS, the ratio /  plays a regulatory role due to the opposite
effect of fairness concern on the two efforts. Only when the ratio is enough high,
which indicates effect of private solution efforts on performance is more obvious than
the shared knowledge stock, can performance be driven by fairness concern.
Furthermore, the biggest advantage of crowdsourcing innovation has been cited to be
the scale [11,14,31](Howe 2008; Feyisetan and Simperl 2017; Hao et al. 2016). But we
find the influence of the crowdsourcee numbers on project performance depends on
the ratio / k if crowdsourcees have the psychology of fairness concern. The high
values mean the dominant effect of knowledge sharing (i.e. the effect of performance
improving which is good for crowdsourcer) is obvious. In this case, vertical fairness
concern is manifested as “jealousy”, and the increase of crowdsourcee numbers is not
conducive to the project performance; on the contrary, the result is opposite as the
hidden effect (i.e. the effect of private effort cost reduction which is good for
themselves) is obvious, and the fairness concern is more manifested as “pride”.
Finally, from the perspective of economy, the incentive mechanism of knowledge
sharing can achieve a win-win situation for both sides. This shows that no matter for
the crowdsourcer or the crowdsourcees, the benefits from the incentive mechanism of
knowledge sharing are higher than the cost of their expenditure. We also find the
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value caused by knowledge sharing incentive mechanisms always increases with the
improvement of the sensitivity of vertical fairness concern thanks to the
crowdsourcer’s response strategy mentioned before (increasing project bonuses and
unit knowledge sharing reward). Moreover, the impact of crowdsourcee numbers on
the relative value of knowledge sharing incentive mechanism depends on ratio / k ,
which is line up with the rule of project performance. If the project bonus and the cost
of private solution efforts are taken into account, we can say the results can be more
complex. Because the crowdsourcees’ private effort increase with the sensitivity of
their vertical fairness concern, so, to the crowdsourcer, only when the coefficient of
private solution cost is small and the performance conversion rate is high (i.e. the
crowdsourcee has a higher problem-solving ability), does its total economic gain
positively correlate with the vertical fairness concern. But to crowdsourcees, the
vertical fairness concern must help raise their absolute economic gains in all circum.
We think this is the embodiment of “backward advantage”.
Implications
The conclusions provide useful implications to improve the performance of
crowdsourcing contest innovation project.
The authors address how crowdsourcers should actively promote a knowledge sharing
incentive mechanism. Specifically related to a knowledge sharing community (for
example - an online forum or platform) where participants can exchange their
professional knowledge and skills.
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In addition, the authors explore how a knowledge sharing behavior evaluation system
should be established online to effectively identify the part of shared knowledge that
really leads to performance improvement and then use it as a reward benchmark.
Interesting discussions are made to discuss the importance for crowdsourcers to
correctly treat the psychology of crowdsourcees’ vertical fairness concern, and try to
convert through mathematics complex emotional behaviors, such as the feeling of
“pride” and “jealousy”
One interesting finding made, is that more attention should be paid to the evaluation
the cost associated with online participants experience or skill-levels, to highlight the
role of sharing knowledge in reducing private answering costs and improve its
“recessive effect”. The implementation of knowledge training system in the
community is also discussed to review how the efficiency of crowdsourcees in
transforming public knowledge into crowdsourcing performance. On this basis,
crowdsourcers should project a “project bonus” to attract more participants and/or
effectively expand the project’s scope and outputs.
The aurthors close with a critical discussion, to consider how crowdsourcees have
more professional skills but lower willingness to share knowledge (for example, the
radio /  is relatively high), then fairness concern psychology is not conducive to
the improvement of knowledge stock and crowdsourcing performance. Therefore, the
level of individual solution should not be the only criterion for the admission to the
crowdsourcing contest. crowdsourcers should test their psychological characteristics
when recruiting participants. If they are too jealous or conservative, they should be
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abandoned decisively. In addition, in the process of project, crowdsourcers should
also maintain certain communication with the crowdsourcees, and guide them not to
pay too much attention to the income gap.
Limitations and Future Research
Though the conclusions and implications show robust in the assumptions set forth in
this paper, we still want to remind the readers not to freely apply our results to all
situations. Only when the type of crowdsourcing is a creative contest, the performance
formula is valid. However, in a professional crowdsourcing contest, the performance
function and the winning probability will show a significant difference. Moreover, in
this paper, we consider the homogeneity of crowdsourcees which does not correspond
to the reality. In the future, we can further consider the heterogeneity between
crowdsourcee and crowdsourcer. The impact of horizontal fairness concern among
crowdsourcees on knowledge sharing incentive mechanisms will be also significant.
The conclusions of this paper focus on theoretical analysis and numerical simulation
and need to be further tested by empirical analysis.
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Figures
Figure1: Process of knowledge sharing incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing community
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Figure 2: The impact of n and  on KS NKSi i  (low / k )
Figure 3: The impact of n and  on KS NKSi i  (high / k )
Figure 4: The impact of  on KS*i
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Figure 5: The impact of n on KS*i
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Considering crowdsourcer acts as a leader and crowdsourcees are the followers, we
first solve out the decisions of the crowdsourcees. Taking the first partial derivatives
of iU with respect to ie and is respectively, and substituting the symmetry
strategy 1 2 *i ie e ... e e    , 1 2 *i is s ... s s    obtained from the homogeneity
hypothesis, the following equations are obtained:
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which indicates that NKS _ie and NKS _is is the optimal private solution effort and knowledge
42
sharing level of the recipients under NKS mode. Substituting Formula (A2) back into
Formula (1), (6) and (5), the expressions of project performance, expected economic
benefit of the crowdsourcees and the crowdsourcer can be obtained as follows:
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According to 0NKS _f / A   , the optimal project bonus set by the crowdsourcer under
vertical fairness concern is:
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It leads the optimal private solution effort and knowledge sharing level under variable
project bonus to be
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Substituting back into (A3), we have
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(A6)
Proof of Lemma 2
Similar to the NKS model, the decision of the crowdsourcees is solved first. Taking
the first partial derivatives of iU with respect to ie and is respectively, and
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substituting the symmetry strategy 1 2 *i ie e ... e e    ， 1 2 *i is s ... s s    obtained
from the homogeneity hypothesis, the following equations are obtained:





















   
  
     

             
(A7)
We get the pooling equilibrium
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Obviously KS _ie and KS _is is the optimal private solution effort and knowledge sharing
level of the crowdsourcees under KS mode.Then we solve the crowdsourcer’s
decision. Substituting Formula (A8) back into Formula (9), we get crowdsourcer’s
benefit expression with respect to b as:
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It’s easy to see that  f b is A concave function of b. According to   0f b / b   ,
the optimal linear incentive coefficient of knowledge sharing under model KS is
obtained. Then we substitute it into Formula (A8) to get optimal knowledge sharing
level s:
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(A11)
Finally, we get the expression of expected project performance and beneficial of both
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parties under model KS as:
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(A12)
Proof of Proposition 1
According to 0NKS _ie  and 0NKS _is  in Lemma 1, two threshold expressions are
obtained. Then calculate the first-order partial derivative of the threshold to  , we
can derive the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
The expression of the threshold  is obtained from 0KS*b  in Lemma2, Then
calculate the first-order partial derivative of  to  , we can achieve the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
The first partial derivatives of the relevant parameters are obtained by the expression
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So, when    
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Proof of Proposition 4
Comparing the corresponding expressions in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can get that
KS* NKS*A A , KS _ NKS _i ie e , KS* NKS*i ie e , and have:
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(A14)
Proof of Proposition 5
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Combined with the conditions of Proposition 2, it can be known that when ekc  ,
 KS* NKS*i is s is positively correlated with n ; on the contrary, it is negatively related
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to n .
Proof of Proposition 6
Calculating the first order partial derivative from  NKS*E v and  KS*E v which appear
respectively in Equation (13) and (21) to  , the results are as follows:
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. Due to 0 1  , we have
 
1 1 1




Equation (1) is proven. In addition, the sign symbol of





on    2 1 1 ekc     .
Proof of Proposition 7
The first partial derivative of  is obtained from the expressions of NKS*f and
KS* NKS*
f f  which appear respectively in Equation (13) and (21), the results are as
follows:
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depends on the sign of
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must be established, otherwise, the sign of
KS*
f



cannot be judged.
